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Abstract
Since the seminal work from F. Cohen in the eight-
ies, abstract virology has seen the apparition of suc-
cessive viral models, all based on Turing-equivalent
formalisms. But considering recent malware such as
rootkits or k-ary codes, these viral models only par-
tially cover these evolved threats. The problem is that
Turing-equivalent models do not support interactive
computations. New models have thus appeared, offer-
ing support for these evolved malware, but loosing
the unified approach in the way. This article provides
a basis for a unified malware model founded on
process algebras and in particular the Join-Calculus.
In terms of expressiveness, the new model supports
the fundamental definitions based on self-replication
and adds support for interactions, concurrency and
non-termination allows the definition of more complex
behaviors. Evolved malware such as rootkits can now
be thoroughly modeled. In terms of detection and pre-
vention, the fundamental results of undecidability and
isolation still hold. However the process-based model
has permitted to establish new results: identification
of fragments from the Join-Calculus where malware
detection becomes decidable, formal definition of the
non-infection property, approximate solutions to re-
strict malware propagation.
Index Terms
Malware theoretical models – Malware detection
and prevention – Process Algebra – Information flow.
1. Introduction
Looking at recent publications, process calculi such
as the pi-calculus are widespread in the modeling of
biological systems either molecular-based or cellular-
based [1], [2]. Computer virology is a domain where
numerous parallels can be drawn between infectious
diseases and malicious codes, commonly called mal-
ware. A question can be naturally raised: are process
calculi also adapted to computer virology?
1.1. Related works and contribution
Considering malware, a recent article underlines the
fact that interactions with the execution environment,
concurrency and also non-termination prove to be im-
portant computation functionalities [3]. In effect, mal-
ware, being resilient and adaptive by nature, intensively
use these functionalities to survive and infect new
systems. Looking at the theoretical models existing
in abstract virology, they mainly focus on the self-
replication capacity which is defined in a purely func-
tional way [4],[5, Chpt.2-3],[6]. Unfortunately, these
models rely on Turing-equivalent formalisms which
can hardly support interactive computations. With the
apparition of interaction-based viral techniques, new
models have thus been introduced to cope with this
drawback, but loosing the unified approach in the
way. The apparition of k-ary malware is an obvious
example. In effect, these malware heavily rely on
concurrency by a distribution of the malicious code
over several executing parts. A new model based on
Boolean functions has been provided to model their
evolving interdependence over time [7]. A second
relevant example is the apparition of reactive non-
terminating techniques such as stealth currently de-
ployed in rootkits. Different models have been pro-
vided to cover stealth based either on steganography
[8] or graph theory [9].
According to [3], by evolving towards interaction-
dedicated formalisms such as process calculi, a unified,
reference model for malware could be defined to sup-
ar
X
iv
:0
90
2.
04
69
v2
  [
cs
.C
R]
  2
0 A
pr
 20
09
port these innovative techniques. Generally speaking,
process calculi model the computer notion of process,
that is to say an executing entity, mobile and communi-
cating inside a context [10]. This perspective is closer
to our nowadays vision of computer systems. The
problem is now to choose the most adapted process
calculus between the different existing ones. In order
to keep the expressiveness of former models based
on self-replication, the chosen process calculus must
support both functional and interactive aspects. After
study, the Join-Calculus was found to be the most
adequate for building a malware model [11], [12].
As previously said, moving towards process calculi
makes the malware model closer to reality while offer-
ing a greater expressiveness. However, the model still
provides reasoning and proof facilities since it relies
on an established theoretical formalism. But this is not
the only benefit. The interactive aspects increase the
visibility of computations and information flows. As
a consequence, the identification of potential detection
methods and the localization of possible control points
become proportionally easier. The contribution of this
article can be summed-up to the following points:
• Elaboration of a new viral model based on the
Join-Calculus. Starting from the self-replication
mechanism from functional models, this new
model subsequently extends their expressiveness
to support interactions, concurrency and infinite
reactive computations.
• Extension of the viral model to generic malware
through a parametrization of the key components:
the replication mechanism, the research of the
replication target and the payload.
• Study of the impact of the formalism migration
on the fundamental results concerning detection
and prevention.
The article is articulated as follows. A first short in-
troduction of the Join-Calculus is given to end this in-
troduction. Section 2 briefly summarizes the functional
notion of self-replication inside former viral models.
Section 3 introduces the new process-based model
which allows the definition of a distributed, context-
dependent version of the self-replication. Section 4
extends the model to generic malware with an example
of model parametrization to support companion viruses
and rootkits. Once the model established, Section 5
addresses the existence of an algorithm either to detect
malware relatively to a system context or to assess the
resistance of system contexts relatively to a given class
of malware. At last, Section 6 focuses on proactive
solutions with the purpose of malware prevention.
1.2. Introducing the Join-Calculus
This minimal introduction is only given to guar-
antee the self-containment of the article. Any reader
interested in a thorough introduction is referred to
the relative literature [11], [12]. At the basis of the
Join-Calculus, an infinite set N of names x, y, z... is
defined. Names can be compound into vectors using
the notation −→x equivalent to x0, x1, ..., xn. Names
constitute the basic blocks for message emissions of
the form x<v> where x is called the channel and
v the transmitted message. Given in the Figure 1, the
syntax of the Join-Calculus defines three different ele-
ments to handle message passing: processes (P ) being
the communicating entities, definitions (D) describing
the system evolution resulting of the interprocess-
communication, and the join-patterns (J) describing
the channels and messages involved in the communi-
cation [11, pp.57-60].
For ease of modeling, the syntactic facilities offered
by the support of expressions (E) have been introduced
[11, pp.91-92]. These facilities can model among oth-
ers the synchronous channels necessary to concurrent
functional languages. Notice that these additional fa-
cilities can be translated into the minimal core of the
Join-Calculus.
P ::= v<E1; ...;En> asynchronous message
| def D in P local definition
| P | P parallel composition
| 0 null process
| E;P sequence
| let x1, ..., xm = E in P expression computation
| return E1, ..., En to x synchronous return
E ::= v(E1; ...;En) synchronous call
| def D in E local definition
| E;E sequence
| let x1, ..., xm = E in E synchronous call
D ::= J . P reaction rule
| D ∧D definition conjunction
| > null definition
J ::= x<y1, ..., yn> message pattern
| x(y1; ...; yn) call pattern
| J | J join of patterns
Figure 1. Enriched syntax for the Join-Calculus.
Based on the syntax, the names are divided be-
tween three sets: 1) the channels defined through a
join definition (dv), 2) the names bound by a join-
pattern (rv) and 3) the free names (fv). The inductive
construction of these sets can be found in [11, p.47].
In addition to the syntax, an operational semantic
is mandatory to establish the computational model.
The semantic is established by a Reflexive Chemical
Abstract Machine (RCHAM) described by the rules
from the Figure 2 [11, pp.56-62]. In particular, the
reduction rule describes the system evolution after the
resolution of an exchange of messages. The reduction
only occurs if the exchanged messages satisfy the join-
pattern of an existing definition:
def x(−→z ) . P in x(−→y ) −→ P{−→y /−→z } where
{−→y /−→z } is the name substitution.
STR-JOIN ` P1 | P2 
 ` P1;P2
STR-NULL ` 0 
 `
STR-AND D1 ∧D2 ` 
 D1, D2 `
STR-NODEF T ` 
 `
STR-DEF ` def D in P 
 Dσdv ` Pσdv
RED J . P ` Jσrv −→ J . P ` Pσrv
Substitution conditions:
-STR-DEF: σdv substitutes the defined channels from dv[D]
using freshly generated, distinct names.
-RED: σrv substitutes the transmitted messaged to the bound
names from rv[J ].
Figure 2. Join-Calculus Operational semantic.
2. Autonomous self-replication in virology
The notion of self-replication is at the heart of
computer virology since it is the common denominator
between the different classes of viruses and worms.
Referring to the early works of J. von Neuman [13],
two fundamental concepts are mandatory for self-
replication: a replication mechanism and the existence
of a self-description also called self-reference.
As corroborated by successive publications [14],
[4],[5, Chpt.2-3],[6], self-replication proves to be
directly linked to the concept of recursion being
present in the different computation paradigms. In
these different functional viral models, all Turing-
equivalent according to the Church-Turing thesis [15],
both the self-reference and the replication mechanism
can be identified. Let us consider Definition 1
extracted from [6]. This virus definition remains
the most expressive and flexible viral model which
actually proves to be compatible with former ones.
As a consequence of Kleene’s recursion theorem [15],
a virus is built as the solution of a fixed point equation.
Definition 1: Using a Go¨del numbering, programs
are indexed by integers and ϕp(x) denotes the
computation of the program indexed by p over the
argument x. According to Bonfante, Kaczmarek and
Marion, a virus v is a program which, for all values
of p and x over the computation domain D, satisfies
the equation ϕv(p, x) = ϕβ(v,p)(x) where β denotes
the propagation method.
In this definition, the concepts necessary to self-
replication are explicitly defined. The replication
mechanism is defined through the propagation function
β. As for the self-reference, it is denoted by the
program v which is both considered as an executed
program and a parameter for the propagation function
whether it is on the left or the right side of the equation.
The program p is called the target of the replication and
the function β implicitly contains a research routine for
selecting a new valid target for the next replication.
These different terms are important and must be kept
in mind since they are reused all along the article.
3. Distributed self-replication
As underlined by M. Webster in its classification
[16], self-replicating systems, and in particular viruses,
do not necessarily contain their own self-reference
access or their own replication mechanism. They often
rely on external services to access these fundamental
elements. Let us consider an interpreted virus in
bash [5, Chpt.7]; the replication is achieved using
commands provided by the language such as cp and
the self-reference is accessed through $0. Therefore,
the advantages offered by process calculi in terms of
modeling become undeniable: exchanges between the
process and their environment, possible distribution
of the computations.
As seen in the previous section, for self-replication
to be modeled functionally, the self-reference notion
is required; so it is for process modeling. In order to
self-reference themselves, programs must be built as
process abstractions (definition with a single pattern):
Dp = def p(−→arg) . P where P is defined in function
of the argument vector −→arg. The program execution
is therefore a process instantiation of the abstraction:
Ep = def Dp in p(
−→
val). This hypothesis will be
kept all along the article even if it is not explicitely
recalled. Based on this hypothesis, self-replication
becomes the emission of this definition on an external
channel, this channel being the target of the replication.
Definition 2: (SELF-REPLICATION) A program
is said self-replicating over a channel c, where c
is the replication target, if it can be modeled as a
Join-Calculus definition capable to propagate itself
(i.e. to extrude itself beyond its scope) on this
channel. This definition can be translated as follows:
def s(c,−→x ) . R where R ⇓c(s). ⇓c(s) is the barb
predicate where the value transmitted over the channel
c is no longer open to any name but restricted to v.
In this definition, s denotes the self-reference whereas
R specifies the replication mechanism over c.
3.1. Modeling the environment
Before speaking of any distribution of the replica-
tion, the execution environment in which processes
evolve must be thoroughly defined. To draw a parallel
with Cohen’s model, a viral sequence must be consid-
ered with respect to a defined Turing Machine. If left
undefined, he actually proved in [17] that considering
any sequence, a Turing Machine can be found for
which this sequence is a virus.
Process contexts prove to be useful tools to define
execution environments. Let us consider that all exe-
cution environments share an identical global structure
that can be defined as a process context. Generally
speaking, a running operating system, just like any
other execution machine, provides different services
(system calls) and resources (memory space, files,
registry). Let us define a system context denoted
Csys[.]S∪R where services and resources constitute the
common bricks, formalized by channel definitions in
the Join-Calculus:
Services: In the Join-Calculus, the available services S
can be modeled by definitions with a behavior similar
to execution servers waiting for queries. The services
itself will be represented by a function conveyed by the
variable fsv . When the service is called, the application
of fsv to the arguments is computed and sent back.
• def Ssv(−→arg) . return fsv(−→arg) in ....
Resources: The set of resources R provide storing
facilities accessible to processes. Resources can be
modeled by parametric processes storing information
inside internal channels. Resources can be either static
providing reading and writing accesses only (data file,
registry keys) or executable triggered on command
(programs).
• Let us consider three simple variables c, cnew, c0:
def Rstat(c0) .
def (write(cnew)|content<c>) .
(return to write|content<cnew>)
∧ (read()|content<c>) .
(return c to read|content<c>)
in content<c0>|return read, write to Rstat in ...
• Let us consider three functions f , fnew, f0:
def Rexec(f0) .
def (write(fnew)|content<f>) .
(return to write|content<fnew>)
∧ (read()|content<f>) .
(return f to read|content<f>)
∧ (exec(−→arg)|content<f>) .
(return f(−→arg) to exec|content<f>)
in content<f0>|return read, write, exec to Rexec in ...
This system context, split between services and
resources, is compliant with the nowadays vision of
computer, or more generically, with most execution
environments. A process alone can not be infectious;
it is viral only if the necessary services and resources
to replicate are provided by the system as well as a
potential external target. Considering this vision, the
notion of virus can now be defined relatively to a
system context by construction of the viral sets [17].
3.2. Construction of the viral sets
Program replication is formalized by the emission
of its definition on an external channel provided by
the environment. Consequently, the barb predicate
defined in the different process calculi is unadapted:
transmitted values are omitted and once the program
is placed inside a process context, reactions become
internal and thus no longer observable by a barb
predicate. We will thus define a new predicate,
more adapted, that will be called valued-reaction. Its
definition is given below.
Definition 3: (VALUED-REACTION) Let P , P ′
be two processes, x a channel and a a value from P
(either bound or free). A valued-reaction P∇x(a)P ′
occurs if and only if P = C[x<a>]S for some process
context C[.]S capturing x i.e. x∈S. By reduction on
join pattern x<a>, P −→ P ′. The ∇x(a) predicate
syntactically checks the possibility for a process P to
react on a channel x with the value a. Once resolved,
the reaction leads to a new process state P ′.
Using valued-reaction, we can now define the
principle of viable replication in a given environment.
Viable replication guarantees that the replicated
version of a program is still capable of self-
replication. This principle was already present in
the self-reproducing cellular automata from J. von
Neuman where cellular configurations iteratively
rebuild themselves at each transition [13]. Similarly,
the replication is iterated by valued-reactions through
two phenomenons:
-Original replication: During the first execution
of the program p, denoted by the process P , p is
replicated over a resource channel. This channel is
consumed by the system context to evolve towards a
new state. This is represented by the predicate:
∃x ∈ R,C[P ]S∪R∇x(p)P ′.
-Successive replications: The successive iterations of
the replications are triggered by the activation of the
intermediate infected resources. If P (i) corresponds
to the execution of the ith infected form, then, the
following predicate should be verified:
∃x ∈ R(i), C(i)[P (i)]S∪R(i)∇x(p)P (i+1).
By definition, the viral sets contain the processes
satisfying the viable self-replication principle. The
notion of viral set from F. Cohen must thus be extended
relatively to a system context which conditions the
consumption of the replicated definitions and the
activation of the intermediate infected forms. In
fact, these viral sets can be built following the same
method of iterated replications.
Definition 4: (VIRAL SET) Let us consider a sys-
tem context Csys[.]S∪R where S denotes the available
services and R the accesses to resources. Its viral set
Ev can be recursively constructed as follows.
Ev(Csys[.]S∪R) = {V | ∃−→x of size n ≥ 2
∃−→x of size n ≥ 2 and −−→exec of size n−1 such as
Csys[V ]S∪R∇v(y0)∇x0(v)C′sys[V ′]S∪R′
and for all 1 ≤ i < n,
C
(i)
sys[execi<
−−→argi>]S∪R(i)∇v(yi)∇xi(v)
C
(i+1)
sys [V
(i+1)]S∪R(i+1)
}
with the following constraints:
- All xi ∈ −→x denote replication targets. They can be
either channels to existing resources: xi ∈ R, or to
dynamically created resources: xi∈R(i) meaning that
xi ∈ rv(J) where J is a join related to a resource
definition D with dv(D) ⊂ R,
- The messages execi<−−→argi> activate the intermedi-
ate infected resources. To avoid biases, they must not
simulate viral activity : execi∈R(i) and argi 6∈bv(V ).
3.3. Distributed virus replication
3.3.1. Environment refinement for replication. Con-
sidering self-replication, several services and resources
must be defined because they may be externalized by
the self-reproducing systems [16]: access to the self-
reference, replication mechanisms and replication tar-
gets. The structure for services and resources, globally
defined in the system context from Section 3.1, must
thus be refined to support these features. The refined
definitions are given below with relevant examples
from current operating systems given in the Table 1:
Self-reference access: Today’s operating systems
all handle a list of executing processes, with a
particular pointer on the active process. This list
is among others used for scheduling. A service is
often provided to access this list and in particular
the pointed active process which denotes the
self-reference. In order to maintain this list, the
program executions must be launched through a
dedicated service.
• Dproc def= procexec(p,−−→args) .
sysupdt(p).return p(
−−→args) to procexec
• Dref def= (sysupdt(rnew)|current<rcur>) .
current<rnew>
∧ (sysref ()|current<rcur>) .
(current<rcur>|return rcur to sysref )
Self-reference access must be considered as a
service even if it uses an internal resource. A
solution is to publish only sysref and procexec in
S (from Csys[.]S∪R). Any process placed in the
context will not have direct writing access to the
internal channel current storing the reference.
From the process perspective, the two provided
channels will be similar to services .
Replication mechanism: The replication mecha-
nism is a function r which copies data from an
input channel towards and output channel. The
function r has been deliberately left parametric
for the model to remain generic. However r is
strongly constrained to forward the input data
towards the output channel after an indefinite
number of transformations.
• Drep def= sysrep(in, out) .
return r(in, out) to sysrep.
Replication targets: A pool of executable re-
sources constitute the replications targets. These
resources can be preexisting (infection) or created
by the malware (duplication).
• Dtarg def= Rtarg(finit) .
def (write(fnew)|content<f>) .
(return to write|content<fnew>)
∧ (read()|content<f>) .
(return f to read|content<f>)
∧ (exec(−→arg)|content<f>) .
(return procexec(f,
−→arg) to exec|content<f>) in
content<finit>|return read, write, exec to Rtarg
Using the previous definition, a system with n re-
sources can be defined as an evaluation context. This
context being enough generic to applied to the majority
of existing systems, we will consider this system con-
text all along this section for the different definitions
and proofs:
Csys[.]S∪R
def= def Dproc ∧Dref ∧Drep ∧Dtarg in
let sr1, sw1, se1, ..., srn, swn, sen =
Rtarg(f1), ..., Rtarg(fn) in (current<null> | [.])
where:
S = {procexec, sysref , sysrep} and R = {−→sr,−→sw,−→se}
Services provided by well-known operating systems
Channels Linux APIs Windows APIs
procexec fork( ), exec( ) CreateProcess( )
sysref getpid( ), GetCurrentProcess( ),
readlink( ) GetModuleFileName( )
sysrep sendfile( ) CopyFile( )
Resources fread( ), ReadFile( ),
Accesses fwrite( ), WriteFile( ),
... ...
Table 1. Parallel between refined channels and
equivalent OS services and resource accesses.
3.3.2. Classes of self-replicating viruses. Using this
refined system context, the four classes of self-
replicating viruses from M. Webster [16] can be de-
fined in this process-based model. Through these four
classes, the important components required for au-
tonomous replication can be found (see Section 2): the
access to the self-reference, a replication mechanism
denoted by the function r and a target research routine
denoted by the function t. These two last functions
have been willingly left parameterizable.
Through parametrization, several types of replica-
tion can be supported, for example: (1) overwriting
infections which can be defined by def r(v, sw).sw(v),
(2) append infections (respectively prepend infections)
with a definition of the form def r(v, sw, sr) . (let p =
sr() in def p1(
−→arg) . v().p(−→arg) in sw(p1)), (3)
companion infections described in a coming section
because of their greater modeling complexity.
With regards to the concept of self-replication
from Definition 2, the virus case is particular since
the target of the replication is no longer passed
as a parameter but chosen by an internal research
routine. The behavior of this routine, just like the
replication mechanism, must remain parameterizable.
Generally speaking, successive replications follow
three main schemes: (1) targets are hard-coded in
the virus, like a predefined file path for example,
meaning that the target channel will always be
the same n such as def t() . return n to t,
(2) target resources are dynamically created by
the routine using the facilities of the system
def t() . let sr, sw, se = R(empty) in return sw to t,
(3) target are discovered by running through the
system searching for vulnerable resources. Directory
exploration is a typical example. Once again this
example is too complex to be briefly described here.
The target research must be integrated in the virus
definition, in addition to the self-reference access and
the replication mechanism. Based on this parametric
approach, as well as on the provided modeling of the
system context, four main classes of viruses can be
defined according to the exported services.
Definition 5: Let V be a viral process. Let R and
S be the definition of sub-processes responsible for
the self-reference access and and the replication mech-
anism. An additional definition T is responsible for
researching the target of the infection. At last, a process
P is introduced for the post-infection process i.e. the
payload:
• R def= locrep(in, out) . return r(in, out) to locrep
where r is a parametric function defining the
replication mechanism.
• S def= locref () . return v to locref .
• T def= loctarg() . return t() to locrep where t is a
parametric function defining the routine for target
research.
• P is any process modeling a payload.
Four classes of worms can be defined using these
primitives and the system services:
• (Class I) V is totally autonomous:
VI
def
= defv v(
−→x ) . (defv S ∧R ∧ T
in locrep(locref (), loctarg()).P ) in procexec(v,
−→a )
• (Class II) V uses an external replication mecha-
nism provided by the system:
VII
def
= defv v(
−→x ) . (defv S ∧ T
in sysrep(locref (), loctarg()).P ) in procexec(v,
−→a )
• (Class III) V uses an external access to the self-
reference provided by the system:
VIII
def
= defv v(
−→x ) . (def R ∧ T
in locrep(sysref (), loctarg()).P ) in procexec(v,
−→a )
• (Class IV) V uses only external services:
VIV
def
= defv v(
−→x ) . (def T
in sysrep(sysref (), loctarg()).P ) in procexec(v,
−→a )
In this definition, the research routine T is always
internal to the virus. However, the definition would
support the distribution of this functionality. This case
has not been included in the definition because, to our
knowledge, no malware completely externalize this
functionality. On the other hand, since it runs through
the environment, the target research is likely to use
intensively the system services.
Proposition 1: If the system context Csys[.]S∪R
provides the right services and valid targets, the four
virus classes VI ,VII ,VIII and VIV achieve viable
replication i.e. these classes are included in the viral
set Ev(Csys[.]S∪R).
Proof: Let us consider a system context with
several potential resources as defined in this section.
Let us consider a simple case of parameterization for
the replication mechanism r and the target research
t. Notice that other definitions could be used without
modifying the core of the proof: additional reductions
would only be necessary.
def r(x,w) . w(x)
def t() . return swi to t at the i
th iteration.
Let us consider the case of third class of virus with
the following notations:
DVIII
def
= v() .
(def R ∧ T in locrep(sysref (), loctarg());P ).
DRk
def
= (swk(fnew)|contentk<f>) .
(contentk<fnew>)
∧ (srk()|contentk<f>) .
(contentk<f>|return f to srk)
∧ (sek(−→arg)|contentk<f>) .
(contentk<f>|return procexec(f,−→arg) to sek).
To prove viable replication, it must be proven that
the viral function v initially infect a resource, but
also that an execution request se1(−→a1) reproduces the
infection towards a second writing channel sw2. Next
iterations can then be reduced to these two cases:
Initial infection:
Csys[VIII ]S∪R∇v()∇sw1(p)C′sys[P ]S∪R.
Successive infections:
C′sys[se1(
−→a1)]S∪R∇v()∇sw2(p)C′′sys[P ]S∪R.
` Csys[VIII ]S∪R

 (str-def+str-and)
Dproc, Dref , Drep, Dtarg `
let sr1, sw1, se1, ..., srn, swn, sen = Rtarg(f1), ..., Rtarg(fn)
in (current<null> | VIII)
−→ (react+str-def+str-and)
Dproc, Dref , Drep, Dtarg , DR1 , ..., DRn `
content1<f1> | Πni=2contenti<fi> |
current<null> |defv DVIII in procexec(v,−→a )−→ (str-def)
Dproc, Dref , Drep, Dtarg , DR1 , ..., DRn , DVIII `{v}
content1<f1> | Πni=2contenti<fi> |
current<null> | procexec(v,−→a )
−→ (react)
Dproc, Dref , Drep, Dtarg , DR1 , ..., DRn , DVIII `{v}
content1<f1> | Πni=2contenti<fi> |
current<null> | sysupdt(v).v(−→a )
−→ (react)
Dproc, Dref , Drep, Dtarg , DR1 , ..., DRn , DVIII `{v}
content1<f1> | Πni=2contenti<fi> | current<v> | v(−→a )−→ (react)
Dproc, Dref , Drep, Dtarg , DR1 , ..., DRn , DVIII `{v}
content1<f1> | Πni=2contenti<fi> | current<v> |
defR ∧ T in locrep(sysref (), loctarg()).P

 (str-def+str-and)
Dproc, Dref , Drep, Dtarg , DR1 , ..., DRn , DVIII , R, T `{v}
content1<f1> | Πni=2contenti<fi> | current<v> |
locrep(sysref (), loctarg()).P
−→ (react)
Dproc, Dref , Drep, Dtarg , DR1 , ..., DRn , DVIII , R, T `{v}
content1<f1> | Πni=2contenti<fi> | current<v> |
locrep(v, loctarg()).P
−→ (react)
Dproc, Dref , Drep, Dtarg , DR1 , ..., DRn , DVIII , R, T `{v}
content1<f1> | Πni=2contenti<fi> | current<v> |
locrep(v, sw1).P
−→ (react)
Dproc, Dref , Drep, Dtarg , DR1 , ..., DRn , DVIII , R, T `{v}
content1<f1> | Πni=2contenti<fi> | current<v> |
sw1(v).P
−→ (react)
Dproc, Dref , Drep, Dtarg , DR1 , ..., DRn , DVIII , R, T `{v}
content1<v> | Πni=2contenti<fi> | current<v> | P
Once the initial replication is achieved, the second
replication is activated from the current state thanks
to an execution request se1(−→a1).
Dproc, Dref , Drep, Dtarg , DR1 , ..., DRn , DVIII , R, T `{v}
content1<v> | content2<f2> | Πni=3contenti<fi> |
current<v> | se1(−→a1)
−→ (react)
Dproc, Dref , Drep, Dtarg , DR1 , ..., DRn , DVIII , R, T `{v}
content1<v> | content2<f2> | Πni=3contenti<fi> |
current<v> | procexec(v,−→a1)
From there the reduction is identical to the previous
one except for the call to loctarg which is reduced to
sw2 and no longer sw1.
...
Dref , Drep, Dtarg , DR1 , ..., DRn , DVIII , R, T,R
′, T ′ `{v}
content1<v> | content2<v> | Πni=3contenti<fi> |
current<v> | P
These two reduction prove the viable replication for
viruses of the class VIII . An identical approach can be
used to provide proofs for the remaining classes.
3.4. Distributed worm propagation
The propagation mechanism for worms is similar
to virus replication. The difference lies in the scope
of the extrusion: the abstract definition of the worm
is no longer extruded to a local resource through
a writing channel, but to a remote system context.
This topology can be defined as contexts imbricated
on two levels. A first local system context, similar
to the one from the Section 3.3, is included into a
global architectural context containing parallel remote
systems and communications facilities between them
(a computer network topology for example):
Local context: Let us define a new propagation
service in the local context. The principle of the
propagation service is similar to replication (the
propagation function p replaces the funtion r). This
new local context can be simplified by removing the
resource definitions used to store the replicated code:
Dprop
def
= sysprop(in, out) . return p(in, out) to sysprop
Clsys
def
= def Dproc ∧Dref ∧Dprop
in (current<null> | [.])
Remote context: The remote context must provide
communication facilities between the different
systems. The ComChannel definition enables the
generation of two-way communication channels.
Processing of the data transmitted by the local context
is delegated to the remote parallel contexts running
inside the global architecture. In order to simplify the
model, the definition below only considers a single
process Prsys modeling the remote system but several
systems can run in parallel. In addition, the resources
and services from Prsys can also be refined:
Prsys
def
= let d=rcv() in Pprocessing
Cgarch
def
= def ComChannel() .
def send<m>|receive() . return m to receive in
return send, receive in let sd, rcv=ComChannel()
in [Prsys | [.] ]
Definition 6: Let W be a worm able to propagate to
remote system using P , S et T , the definitions of three
sub-processes respectively responsible for propagation
(pending of the replication for viruses), access to the
self-reference and the research of a potential target:
• P def= locprop(in, out) . return p(in, out) to locprop
• S def= locref () . return w to locref
• T def= loctarg() . return t() to loctarg
Four classes of worms can be defined using these
primitives and the system services:
• (Class I) W is totally autonomous:
WI
def
= def w(−→x ) . (def S ∧ P ∧ T in
locprop(locref (), loctarg()).P
′) in procexec(w,−→a )
• (Class II) W uses an external propagation mech-
anism provided by the system:
WII
def
= def w(−→x ) . (def S ∧ T in
sysprop(locref (), loctarg()).P
′) in procexec(w,−→a )
• (Class III) W uses an external access to the self-
reference provided by the system:
WIII
def
= def w(−→x ) . (def P ∧ T in
locprop(sysref (), loctarg()).P
′) in procexec(w,−→a )
• (Class IV) W uses only external services:
WIV
def
= def w(−→x ) . (def T in
sysprop(sysref (), loctarg()).P
′) in procexec(w,−→a )
The four classes of worms satisfy viable replication
just like viruses do. The main difference comes from
the extrusion of the w definition which is no longer
bound to the local system but can be extended to the
remote context.
Remark 1: Just like replication, the propagation
function can be refined for more complexity. The
simplest case remains the simple copy:
Dprop
def
= def p(in, out) . out<in>
For more complex cases such as Email-worms, inter-
mediate functions can be introduced with their coun-
terparts in the remote system to reverse the processing:
Dprop
def
= def p(in, out) .
out<concat(SMTPheader, base64(in))>
Prsys
def
= let d = rcv() in base64decode(body(d))
The research routine t() can be defined accordingly to
parse the address books of different mail clients.
4. Modeling complex malicious behaviors
Modeling complex behaviors proves the interest of
the parametric approach. This section gives examples
of complex refinements both for the replication func-
tion r and the payload process P from the previous
section.
4.1. Companion viruses
Companion viruses remain a particular case of
the parametric definition of the Section 3.3. Their
specificity lies in their replication mechanism: instead
of overwriting or modifying the content of the
resource targeted by the infection, the virus replaces
this resource from the system perspective. Companion
viruses can be divided between two classes whether
the replacement is achieved (a) by diverting the file
system naming mechanism or (b) by diverting the
hierarchy of execution [5, Chpt.8]. The replication
function is consequently more complex and requires
three steps:
1-a) Renaming or relocation the target of the infection.
1-b) Modification of the system hierarchy of execution.
2) Creation of a new resource under the target name.
3) Copy of the viral code in the replacing resource.
Modeling the file system
In order to model a companion virus, it becomes
necessary to introduce a refined model for the file
system. The purpose of the file system is to associate
a resource name (a system path) with a given location
and access channels (reading, writing, execution).
The principle is thus compatible with our model
of executable resources. In addition, a file system
is introduced into the environment defined in 3.3
which is responsible for maintaining a list of 4-tuples
associated to the different files. Let us give a first
definition of a file entry as well as its access and
update methods:
EFS
def
= E(ninit, srinit, swinit, seinit) .
def ninit(c, p) |entry<sr, sw, se> .
(if [c = dl] then 0 else
if [c = mv] then E(p, sr, sw, se) else
if [c = ex] then se(p) | entry<sr, sw, se> else
if [c = rd] then p(sr()) | entry<sr, sw, se> else
if [c = wr] then sw(p) | entry<sr, sw, se>)
in entry<srinit, swinit, seinit>
The file system provides different commands to
manage these entries. The different command takes the
file name in input, and the file system is responsible
for executing these commands on the right resource
(which are basically modeled as executing processes):
-new to create new files,
-delete to delete existing files,
-move to modify the name of the file (modifying
the name only corresponds to a renaming operation
whereas modifying the complete path is a relocation),
-execute to execute a given file,
-read to read from a given file,
-write to write to a given file.
These commands of the file system are modeled
as definitions whereas the entries of the file system
constitute a set of parallel processes. A file system
definition is given below where the executing parallel
processes correspond to the already existing files
referred by the name vector −→n :
MFS
def
= def EFS in
def new(nnew) . E(nnew, Rexec(null))
∧ delete(ndel) . ndel(dl, null)
∧ move(nold, nnew) . nold(mv, nnew)
∧ execute(nexe, arg) . nexe(ex, arg)
∧ read(nrd,buffer, arg) . nrd(rd, buffer)
∧ write(nwr, data) . nwr(wr, data)
in Πni∈−→n (def ni(c, p) |entryi<sr, sw, se> .
(if [c = dl] then 0 else
if [c = mv] then E(p, sr, sw, se) else
if [c = ex] then se(p) | entryi<sr, sw, se> else
if [c = rd] then p(sr()) | entryi<sr, sw, se> else
if [c = wr] then sw(p) | entryi<sr, sw, se>)
in entryi<sri, swi, sei>)
Modeling the hierarchy of execution
The hierarchy of execution may vary from
an operating system to an other, this introduces
portability issues explaining that companion viruses
gaining preemptive by modifying the hierarchy of
execution are not very common [5, Chpt.8]. The
most common case are companion viruses modifying
the path variable in a Unix environment. An other
example, a little bit outdated, concerns the DOS
architecture where executable files with the .com
extension are preemptive on those with the .exe
extension. In fact, the hierarchy of execution relies on
a shorter designation of programs (path or extension
missing). These short designations are completed
according to the hierarchy of execution. Let us first
define a concatenation operator over names denoted
n1 · n2 and a projection operator pin to recover the
nth concatenated element. A process of completion
must then be defined which is parametric over a list
of complements (file path or extension), ordered by
increasing preemptiveness:
HEX
def
=
complete(sn) | complist<c0, ..., cn> .
let ln0, ..., lnn = sn · c0, ..., sn · cn in
(if [ln0∈dv] then return ln0 | complist<c0, ..., cn>
else ... else
if [lnn∈dv] then return lnn | complist<c0, ..., cn>)
∧ (preempt(c) | complist<c0, ..., cn> .
complist<c, c0, ..., cn−1>
The execution command from the file system must
be modified adequately to try name completion when
the name of the program launched in execution is
unknown from the system. In other words when the
program name is not in the set of defined names.
MFS
def
= def EFS in
def new(nnew) . E(nnew, Rexec(null))
...
∧ execute(nexe, arg) .
if [nexec∈dv] then nexe(ex, arg)
else execute(complete(nexec), arg)
...
Refining replication for companion viruses
From the Definition 5, the two classes of companion
viruses can be obtained by refining the replication
function r. Using this definition of a file system, a
first companion virus V diverting the file naming
mechanism can be defined as follows:
def r(v, ntarg) .
move(ntarg, ncopy);new(ntarg);write(ntarg, v) in ...
The second class of companion viruses relies on
the file system refining to support the execution
hierarchy. Let us consider the target of the replication
as a concatenated name lntarg = sntarg · ext. The
preemptive companion virus can be defined as follows:
def r(v, lntarg, ext) .
preempt(extnew);new(pi1(lntarg) · extnew);
write(pi1(lntarg) · extnew, v) in ...
Model validation
In order to validate the model, it is necessary to
assess its relevance with regards to existing compan-
ion viruses. A parallel has thus been drawn between
the different processes and definitions, and their real
implementation. A recent example of MacOS X virus
circumventing the file naming mechanism has first
been taken. The results are given in the Table 2. The
same work has been done for a second companion
virus for Unix, diverting the execution hierarchy. The
results are given in the Table 3.
4.2. Stealth techniques inside Rootkits
Up until now, the article was only focusing on
modeling self-replication since it is one of the main
characteristics of malware and in particular viruses.
In fact, the Join-Calculus is sufficiently expressive to
describe other malicious behaviors such as stealth.
Even if stealth is not a malicious technique on its
own, deployed in rookits, it becomes a powerful tool
for attackers. Unfortunately, few formal works have
been led on rootkit modeling [19], [8], [9]. Rootkits
thus constitute an interesting choice to assess the
expressiveness of the model, by proving it can be
applied to concrete cases.
This section describes how rootkit behaviors can
be defined in the parametric model by refinement
of the payload process which had not been detailed
yet. Let us consider a piece of malware loading a
rootkit from its body. Based on recursive functions,
the definition published by Zuo and Zhou of viruses
resident relatively to a system call is the closest
result to our approach [19]. Unfortunately, recursive
functions are not really adapted to model reactive,
persistent (non-terminating) programs such as rootkits.
The Join-Calculus should offer far more flexibility.
Services provided by the rootkit
Basically, a rootkit provides through a command
channel a certain number of services to the attacker.
Let us first define n processes S1, ..., Sn corresponding
to these services. A public channel com is provided
to the attacker (through the network, based on
various protocols such as IRC or P2P for the most
spread). This channel supports n different types of
requests represented by the vector −→c = c1...cn. The
names ci themselves correspond to internal command
channels, which, in the case of rootkits, are often
communication channels from the user space where
the client part is running, towards the services running
in the kernel space. A service of proxy relays the
commands received on the public channels towards
the internal channels. This client-server architecture
can be defined as follows. In the first place, a public
communication channel com must be defined between
the attacker A and the rootkit Rkit:
Dcom
def
= def com().
(def send <−→m>|receive() . return −→m to receive in
return send, receive to com) in
let sd, rcv = com() in (A|Rkit)
In first place, the rootkit publishes the list of
supported commands through the public channel.
Once transmitted, it launches the proxy service
waiting for requests from the attacker:
Pproxy
def
= let c, arg = rcv() in c(arg)
Rkit
def
= def c1() . S1|Pproxy
∧ c2(arg) . S2|Pproxy
∧ ...
∧ cn(arg) . Sn|Pproxy in sd<−→c >.Pproxy
In parallel, the attacker receives the available
commands for the different services on the public
channel. The obtained list is stored as the vector −→s .
He can then activate any service by sending a request
containing the corresponding command:
A
def
= let −→s = rcv() in sd<s1, arg1>.sd<s2, arg2>...
Loading the rootkit
Before installation, the rootkit is often stored in the
malware body as an internal component. It must thus
be extruded and loaded either conventionally through
the driver manager or through a diverted mean. In
both cases a specific loading process is required.
Let us consider the conventional loading process by
defining a service of driver manager. This service
basically receives the driver definition and launches
its execution:
Dmdriv
def
= load(d) . d<>
In order to be accessible inside the malware, the
rootkit must be abstracted to ease the loading:
M
def
= (...); def r<> .Rkit in load<r> |M ′
The following loading process is obtained:
def Dmdriv in M −→∗ def Gdr in M ′|Rkit
System call hooking
Companion Virus for Mac-0 Executables ([18],2007)
Platform: Mac OS X
Type: Companion virus based on the directory structure of Mac-0 executables
Processes Implementation
MFS MacOS X file system with the Mac-0 executable structure in repositories: hierarchical tree and meta-information files.
EFS Info.plist containing information on the executable structure and the location of its elements.
Channels Implementation
ntarg The CFBundledExecutable field from Info.plist which denotes the real executable, the target of the infection.
move The cp command from the console.
create, write The two commands are not detached and realized by a single call to the command cp.
Table 2. Parallel with a Companion Virus for MacOS X based on file naming.
vcomp ex v1 ([5, Chpt.8],2005)
Platform: Unix
Type: Companion virus modifying environment variables for preemptiveness
Processes Implementation
MFS Unix file system.
EFS Inode entries for the existing files.
HEX The PATH environment variable.
Channels Implementation
ntarg An absolute file name composed of the short file name and its path.
preempt The command export PATH = NEW PATH : PATH .
create, write The standard file API fopen and fwrite.
Table 3. Parallel with a Companion Virus for Unix based on execution hierarchy.
At last, it is necessary to model the hooking
mechanism just like resident viruses in [19]. Before,
a new entity of the system must be defined: the
system call table which is considered as a resource.
This entity only publish the list of available system
calls on-demand. This list is modeled by a vector of
channel −→sc which can only be modified by the kernel
through a privileged writing access. This privileged
access is modified by the hook channel which from
the malware perspective is considered as private: only
the publish channel is returned at table creation:
Dtsc
def
= Tsc(
−−→
tinit) .
def (publish() | table<−→t >) .
(return
−→
t to publish | table<−→t >)
∧ (hook(−−→tnew) | table<−→t >) . (table<−−→tnew>)
in table<
−−→
tinit> | return publish to Tsc
To access to this privileged channel, the rootkit uses
in a diverted way the system services and in particular
the services of memory allocation. Allocation services
can be used to modify the page protection of a
memory space (IoAllocateMdl under Windows [20,
pp.82-87] and Kmalloc under Linux [21]). Generally
speaking, allocation services take as input a base
address b and a size s and return the result of the
allocation. The hook channel is only leaked if the
base address is equal to the address of the system
call table scbase. In any other case a simple acces is
returned:
Dalloc
def
= alloc(b, s) .
if [b=scbase] then return hook else return access
The interest of hooking for the rootkit is to define a
set of false system calls Rfsc1, ..., Rfscm, in order to
hide files or processes, for example by filtering the
original system calls. These malicious system calls
are registered in a new table which is a vector of m
entries
−→
fsc = fsc1...fscm containing their referring
names:
Dfsc
def
= def fsc1(
−→arg) . Rfsc1
∧ ...
∧ fscm(−→arg) . Rfscm
Rkit
def
= def Dfsc in
let scspace = alloc(scbase, scsize) in scspace(
−→
fsc)
The system evolves along the following derivation
where the leak of the privileged writing channel is
observed from the allocation mechanism:
def Dtsc ∧Dalloc in let pub = Tsc(−→sc) in Rkit −→ ∗
def Dtsc ∧Dalloc ∧Dfsc in table<−→fsc>
Model validation
In order to validate the model, it is necessary to
assess its relevance with regards to existing rootkits.
A parallel has thus been drawn between the different
processes and definitions, and their real implementa-
tion in different malware. The results are given in the
Tables 4, 5 and 6.
SuckIt ([21], [22],2001)
Platform: Linux
Type: kernel space, system call hooking
Processes Implementation
M sk, executable responsible for the rootkit installation from user space.
Rkit core, kernel module embedded in sk to be loaded; it contains the provided services Sn.
Pproxy backdoor, autonomous thread waiting for network requests.
Dmdriv internal module of sk responsible for allocating kernel memory, for writing the core module,
and for resolving the addresses normally addressed by the insmod command.
Dtsc Linux system call table.
Dalloc memory device /dev/kmem.
Rsc hooked versions of the system calls fork, open, read, kill, ...
Channels Implementation
com(sd, rcv) established socket between the attacker and the backdoor thread.−→c hooked version of the olduname system call (kept for compability) allowing communication
between the backdoor thread and the kernel module core to transmit the different commands.
load calls to internal functions of Dmdriv .
alloc kmalloc.
hook write function called with the address returned by kmalloc.
publish sysenter instruction allowing the switch between user and kernel space according to the system call table.−→
fsc calls to hooked functions through the replaced system call table.
Table 4. Parallel with a Linux Kernel Rootkit: SuckIt.
Agony (Sources available on the net by Intox7, 2006)
Platform: Windows
Type: kernel space, system call hooking
Processes Implementation
M agony.exe, executable responsible for the rootkit installation from user space and for transmitting the commands.
Rkit agony.sys, kernel module embedded as a resource in agony.exe. Once loaded, it contains the different services Sn.
Pproxy agony.exe transmits the keyboard input to the driver.
Dmdriv Windows Driver Manager called SCM (ServiceControlManager).
Dtsc SSDT Table (SystemServiceDescriptorTable) containg the adresses of the Windows system calls.
Dalloc Memory allocation services.
Rsc hooked versions of the system calls defined in the kernel module:
ZwQuerySystemInformationHook, ZwQueryDirectoryF ileHook...
Channels Implementation
com Keyboard interface with the console application Agony.exe.−→c DeviceIOControl, a Windows system call used to communicate with drivers.
load Call to CreateService followed by StartService.
alloc MmCreateMdl now replaced by IoAllocateMdl.
hook Writing operation to the space newly allocated.
publish sysenter instruction allowing the switch between user and kernel space according to the system call table.−→
fsc Adresses in memory of the new system calls defined in the kernel module.
Table 5. Parallel with a Windows Kernel Rootkit: Agony.
AgoBot ([23], first version in 2002)
Platform: Windows
Type: user space, hooking not supported
Processues Implementation
M Agobot, originally a P2P worm, supporting in prior versions propagation through vulnerabilities.
Rkit CBot, C++ object defining the different services Sn as well as their handlers.
Pproxy CIrc, objet C++ reponsable de la communication par IRC avec l’attaquant
Gdr CInstaller, C++ object responsible for copying the code and registering in the system (registry key).
Channels Implementation
com IRC communication established through the network.−→c call to the method HandleCommand from the object CBot
load calls to the methods CopyToSysDir and RegSartAdd from the object CInstaller
Table 6. Parallel with a Windows User Rootkit: Agobot.
5. System resilience / replication detection
Modeling facilities are not the only interest of the
process algebra. Since the first formal works from
Cohen, it is well established that virus detection is an
undecidable problem. However, thanks to this formal-
ism, we will now try to identify some fragments of the
Join-Calculus for which the detection problem remains
decidable up to a complexity factor. Let us consider an
algorithm taking as input a system context Csys[ . ]S∪R
and a process P abstracted by the definition p. This
algorithm returns true if P is able to self-replicate
inside the context.
Such an algorithm can be used either for checking
the process replication capability or assessing the con-
text resilience to a viral class. An exhaustive procedure
is described in the Algorithm 1. The purpose of this
algorithm respectively changes whether the context or
the tested process varies:
Detection: Malware detection can be addressed
by identifying replication attempts of various
processes in a fixed system context.
Resilience: Just like in any other domain of com-
puter security, system resilience is addressed
y confronting systems to different a known
attack class. This problem can be addressed
by identifying replication attempts of a given
viral class in various system contexts. The
viral class is defined through a fixed process
in input, which is known to be a malware.
Algorithm 1 Replication detection.
Require: P which is abstracted by p
Require: Csys[ . ]S∪R where S is the set of services and R
the resources
1: Edone ← , Enext ← , C ← Csys[P ]S∪R
2: repeat
3: Esucc ← {C′|C τ−→ C′}
4: if ∃C′ reached by a join pattern x<p> with x ∈ R
or x 6∈ (dv(P ) ∪ S ∪R) then
5: return system is vulnerable to the replication of P
6: end if
7: Edone ← Edone ∪ {C}
8: Esucc ← Esucc\ {Cd∈Esucc|∃Ct∈Edone.Cd ≡ Ct}
9: Enext ← Enext ∪ Esucc
10: if infinite reaction on a join without apparition of new
potential transitions then
11: break
12: end if
13: Choose a new C ∈ Enext
14: until Enext ← 
15: return system is not vulnerable to the replication of P
Proposition 2: Detection of self-replication in the
Join-Calculus is undecidable.
Proposition 3: Detection of self-replication is
decidable if the system context and the process are
defined in the fragment of the Join-Calculus without
name generation.
Algorithm 1 uses a brute-force approach for state
exploration. As a matter of fact, it was not designed for
operational deployment but to study the decidability
of the detection problem. Without surprise, detection
remains undecidable according to Proposition 2.
However, according to Proposition 3, the problem
can become decidable by restricting name generation.
This restriction is not without impact on the system
context. Forbidding name generation induces a fixed
number of resources without possibility to dynamically
create new ones. But most importantly, without name
generation, synchronous communication is no longer
possible, in particular for services which can not
generate fresh names to return values. Unique and
fixed return channels must be specified instead.
Proof: In the algorithm, the set of states
Esucc reached after a single reduction is finite
because only internal transitions τ are considered.
Internal transitions in join-calculus are finite state
branching [24]. The decidability thus depends on the
bounded number of iterations (finite number of states
potentially reached and infinite loop detection). To
prove the decidability, we will reduce the detection
problem to the coverability problem in petri nets.
Let us consider the fragment of the join-calculus
without name generation i.e. no nested definitions
of the form def J . (def J ′ . P ′ in P ) in Q.
This fragment can be encoded in the asynchronous
pi-calculus without external choice. Let us consider
a similar encoding to [25] except that the replication
operator has been replaced by recursive equations in
order to be consistent with the remaining of the proof:
[[Q|R]]j = [[Q]]j | [[R]]j
[[x<v>]]j = x¯v
[[def x<u> | y<v> .Q in R]]j =
A = x(u).y(v).([[Q]]j | A)
A | [[R]]j
ff
Name generation being excluded and the process
being considered in a close context, the scope re-
striction ν is absent from the encoding. We will now
reuse the approach in [26] to reduce the problem.
Using the provided encoding, the process inside its
system context can be encoded in the asynchronous pi-
calculus, resulting in a system of parametric equations
satisfying the normalized form from [26].
This system is then encoded into equations from
the Calculus of Communicating Systems (CCS). CCS
is parameterless, however, without name generation,
channel σ and possible transmitted value a can be
combined in a single channel <σ, a>. Notice that this
encoding reintroduces the external choice + to handle
the combined channels. Just like in [26], the obtained
equation system thus contains a set of parallel pro-
cesses guarded by these channels. The only differences
lie in the multiple join patterns in join-calculus which
results in multiple channels guarding these processes:
Ai = Σ <σ, a> . <σ
′, a′> .(Π <σ, a> | Π Aj)
In this equation system, the replication detection
is reduced to the problem of knowing if one of the
guarded process Ai is activated over a channel <σ, p>
with σ ∈ R and p is the abstraction of P . This is
typically a control reachability problem in CCS. It has
been proven in [26] that control reachability can finally
be reduced to the coverability problem in petri nets.
Although it is time and space consuming, there exist
decidable algorithms computing coverability [27] and
thus able to detect any token in the σp place, referring
to the emission of the process definition on the σ the
channel.
6. Policies to prevent malware propagation
The previous section deals with the problem of
malware detection through their self-replication char-
acteristic. It has been proven that detection was de-
cidable only under certain assumptions. The problems
concerning decidability and the fact that detection is
reactive and not proactive encourage the research of
alternative solutions to fight against malware. It is thus
important to consider other proactive approaches such
as the prevention of malware propagation. This section
first describes the malware propagation as an illegal
information flow and then envisage different solutions
for malware containment.
6.1. Non-infection property and isolation
A different approach to fight back the threat brought
by malware is to reason in terms of information flow
as initiated by F. Cohen in [28]. Active research
works are currently led in order to control illicit
data flows between processes of different security
levels [29], [30], [31]. One of the main result is the
formalization of the non-interference property which
specifies that the behavior of a low-level process
must not be influenced by an upper-level process.
This non-interference property is used for addressing
confidentiality issues.
Similarly, the replication process of malware can
be compared to an illicit information flow of the viral
code towards the system. Let us state the hypothesis
that, contrary to malware, legitimate programs should
not interfere with other processes implicitly through
the system. This is a typically an integrity issue,
and the non-interference property must be adapted
accordingly. We have thus defined in Theorem 1 a
new property called non-infection in reference to the
original property of non-interference [29].
Theorem 1: (NON-INFECTION). Let us consider
a process P placed into a system context considered
stable (i.e. potential reactions to intrusions only). The
property of non-infection is satisfied by P if the system
evolves along the reaction Csys[P ] −→∗ C ′sys[P ′], and
for any non-infecting test process T the equivalence
Csys[T ] ≈ C ′sys[T ] is true. The strength of the
property is determined by the equivalence considered.
The non-infection property guarantees the integrity
of the system context. With regards to this property,
the consequent question is to know what are the
mandatory constraints for a system context to satisfy
non-infection. The Proposition 4 states that there
exist systems preventing replication through resource
isolation. This proposition in fact corresponds to a
generalization of the network partitioning principle
advocated by F. Cohen to fight virus propagation [28].
Proposition 4: In a system context made up of
services and resources, the non-infection property can
only be guaranteed by a tight isolation of the resources.
Proof: Let us consider a system context made
up of services and resources (see Section 3.1) of the
form: Csys = def DS ∧DR in R | [ . ]
By hypothesis the context is stable and will only
react to intrusions from the process P placed inside.
To prove that isolation is required, we show that any
writing access to a resource, either direct or indirect,
must be forbidden. Let us begin by enumerating the
possible intrusion cases from the process P :
I. Intrusion towards a resource:
J ∈ DR with J = x1(−→y1)|...|xn(−→yn) . R′
def DS∧DR\{J}∧J in R0|x1(−→z1).R1|...|xm(−→zm).Rm|[ . ]
xm+1(
−−−−→zm+1)|...|xn(−→zn)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
def DS ∧DR in R0|R1|...|Rm|R′[−→y /−→z ]|[ . ].
This can be simplified since in our model the xi are
only used to store the resource content meaning that
Ri = 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. From there, there are three
sub-cases for this transition.
1) Reading from the resource:
R′ ≡ x1(−→y1)|...|xm(−→ym) |return −→y1, ...,−→ym to xm+1.
Once the return consumed, the system recover its
initial state before the intrusion: the non-infection
property is satisfied.
2) Writing to the resource:
R′ ≡ x1(−−−→ym+1)|...|xm(−→yn)|return to xm+1. Once the
return consumed, the original values yi with 1≤ i≤m
are sustituted by values yj with m + 1≤ j ≤ n. It is
not thus guaranteed that the system will recover its
original state before the intrusion: the non-infection
property may not be satisfied.
3) Executing the resource:
This sub-case is equivalent to intrusion towards a
service (see II.).
II. Intrusion towards a service:
J ∈ DS with J = x1(−→y1)|...|xn(−→yn) . S
def DS \ {J} ∧ J ∧DR in R | [ . ]
x1(
−→z1)|...|xn(−→zn)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
def DS ∧DR in S[−→y /−→z ] | R′ | [ . ]
S is of the form return f(−→z1 , ...,−→zn) to x1 which re-
duces to the null process when the return is consumed.
The system modification thus depends on the nature of
the fonction f . Once again, there are three sub-cases.
1) Definition of f accessing no resource or only
through a reading channel: This case is identical to the
case I.1) and the non-infection property is satisfied.
2) Definition of f using a writing or creation channel
for resources: This case is identical to the case I.2)
and the non-infection property may not be satisfied.
3) Definition of f accessing resources in execution: In
this case, the solution depends on the content of the
resource. The same test is applied recursively to this
content until reaching the cases II.1) or II.2).
6.2. Policies to restrict infection scope
The non-infection property is impossible to
guarantee in practice. The complete isolation of
resources can not obviously be considered in systems
without loosing most of their use [28]. In fact, the
hypothesis stated in 6.1 about legitimate programs
is not always true in real cases. But if non-infection
is impossible to deploy, approximate solutions can
still contain the malware propagation by restricting
spatially and temporally the resource accesses. Such
a restriction does not completely prevent malware
propagation but the scope of the propagation is at
least be confined.
Such a restriction can be deployed by an access
authority, blocking any unauthorized access to the
resources and services of a system. A solution
based on access tokens can be considered, either
for spatial restriction (only program and resources
sharing the same token can access each other) or
for time restriction in terms of counting executions
(a given token can be used a fixed number of
times). As defined in [32], an access authority is
generically made up of two components: a Policy
Decision Point (PDP) which can be seen as the token
distribution mechanism and a Policy Enforcement
Point (PEP) which checks the token validity and thus
must not be bypassed (Definition 7). The obligation
to pass through a verification authority is similar
to the transitive non-interference where high-level
information can only transit to low-level channels
through an intermediate [30]. This is reserved for
future works.
Definition 7: An access authority is constituted of:
-A distribution process to deliver tokens denoted DT .
-A control mechanism providing interfaces
−−→
chk to
submit tokens for checking.
The interfaces and the control mechanism are directly
embedded in the system. The control is securely
enforced (i.e. can not be bypassed) if the system
without the distribution process satisfies the non-
infection property.
Example 1: Let T be a security token, non-
forgeable i.e. if unknown, the token can not be rebuilt.
T must thus not be exported by the system context:
Csys[.]S∪R∪−−→chk with T 6∈ S and T 6∈ R. Control can
then be enforced at the resources and services level
using the interface chk which compare the token in
entry with the security token T :
• def Ssv(t,−→arg) .
if chk(t, T ) then return fsv(
−→arg) else 0 in ...
• def Rexec(f0) .
def (write(t, fnew)|content<f>) .
if chk(t, T ) then (return to write|content<fnew>)
else content<f>
∧ (read(t)|content<f>) .
if chk(t, T ) then (return f to read|content<f>)
else content<f>
∧ (exec(t,−→arg)|content<f>) .
if chk(t, T ) then (return f(−→arg) to exec|content<f>)
else content<f>
in content<f0>|return read, write, exec to Rexec in ...
The example above is quite basic. It shows that
if T is not forgeable and no distribution mechanism
is responsible for its extrusion, the process placed in
the context will not be able to access any service and
resource. Mechanisms of access control definitely help
to contain malware propagation. In fact, complete
access control mechanims are already deployed in
two well known security models for Java [33] and
.Net [34]. In both models, the managed code is run in
a isolated runtime environment (Java Virtual Machine
or Common Language Runtime) with a controlled
access to resources. A schematic view of the access
control in the .Net framework is given in Figure 3. A
parallel between the two models is given in the table
below. These two access control models are already
used to restrict malware propagation by restraining
the number of services and resources available to
untrusted codes. For example, the Same Origin
Policy (SOP) forbid accesses to local resources, to
any remote code running inside a web-browser. The
problem in actual system is that these controls are
restricted to managed language and not to native
code. These works on malware prevention prove that
extending control to native code would help to fight
malware propagation.
Model Java framework .NET framework
Token distribution Secure class Policy resolution
(process D) loader of the Common
Language Runtime
(CLR)
Input for Evidences Evidences
distribution (certificate, origin) (certificate, origin)
Output Permission domain Permission set
(token T )
Access control Security Manager Code Access
(interface chk) calling the Access Security (CAS)
Controler using enforced by
Checkpermission() the CLR
7. Conclusion and perspectives
This paper introduces the basis for a unified malware
model based on process algebra and more particularly
the Join-Calculus. Moving from the functional models
currently used in abstract virology to process-based
models do not result in a loss of expressiveness. The
fundamental results are supported by the new model:
characterization of the self-replication, undecidability
of the detection and isolation as perfect prevention.
In addition, the new model offers a greater expres-
siveness by the support of interactions, concurrency
and non-termination which are commonly used in
recent malware. In addition to computational aspects,
these interactive notions ease the definition of complex
behaviors such as stealth in rootkits. But modeling
is not the only benefit; use of process algebra has
provided new fundamental results in terms of detection
and prevention. Even if the global problem of virus
detection remains undecidable in this formalism, a
fragment of the Join-Calculus where detection be-
comes decidable has been identified. With regards to
prevention, the property of non-infection has been pre-
cisely defined as well as solutions to restrict malware
propagation.
In fact, just like no-interference, non-infection is
a property which proves too strong for real cases.
Approximate solutions based on security tokens have
been evoked in the paper but future works can be
led to reduce the strength of the property. Looking
at existing works in process algebra, a promising
perspective is to associate security levels to process
through a typing mechanism.
8. Works in progress
8.1. Security levels and typing
Theorem 2: (RESTRICTED NON-INFECTION).
Let us consider a process considered with potentail
risk Γ risk P placed into a system context
considered stable (i.e. potential reactions to intrusions
only) and legitimate Γ leg Csys[0]. The property of
non-infection is satisfied by P if the system evolves
along the reaction Csys[P ] −→∗ C ′sys[P ′], and for any
non-infecting test process Γ leg T the equivalence
Csys[T ] ≈ C ′sys[T ] is true. The strength of the
property is determined by the equivalence considered.
Just like the original non-infection, restricted non-
infection is only achieved if a complete isolation is
made between legitimate and risky resources. This
property is less strong and allows the modification
of legitimate resources between them. Other typings
may be defined as controls either for resources ac-
cesses (parallel with behavioral blocking) or informa-
tion flows (parallel with tainting techniques) to prevent
self-replication.
8.2. Stealth and observation
Let O be a process monitoring one or several
behaviors µ = µ1...µn in a system S (IDS or
behavioral AV). When an attack is detected, the
process switches to a state signaling the detection OI :
O|S µi−→ OI |S′.
Definition 8: (STEALTH) Let us define stealth
relatively to an observer (and no longer to a system
call [19]). The definition of an observer determines
Figure 3. .NET Security Model for access control.
the observed behaviors which may bay coumpound
of system calls. A malicious code M is stealthy with
respect to an observer O if:
O|S|M 6−→∗ OI |S′.
A malicious code can be stealthy for any legitimate
observer. However, malware necessarily modify
legitimate programs, otherwise the non-infection
property would be satisfied and it would not be
a malware. An observer can thus be found to
detect a malware. In other words absolute stealth for
malicious code is impossible. This result is promising
for behavioral observation. A parallel can be drawn
with E. Filiol’s result saying that it is not possible to
introduce a stealthy malicious code without modifying
significantly the distribution for an estimator [8].
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